**Abstract for D. Herman's chapter on "Narrative Theory after the Second Cognitive Revolution"**

This chapter uses Ernest Hemingway's 1927 story "Hills Like White Elephants" to explore the relevance of ideas from the field of discursive psychology for cognitive cultural studies. In Derek Edwards' and Jonathan Potters' account, "rather than seeing [...] discursive constructions as expressions of speakers' underlying cognitive states, [discursive psychologists examine such states] in the context of their occurrence as situated and occasioned constructions whose precise nature makes sense, to participants and analysts alike, in terms of the social actions those descriptions accomplish" (Edwards and Potter, *Discursive Psychology*, 1992, p. 2). Discursive psychology can thus be aligned with a range of research initiatives seeking to develop post-Cartesian frameworks for research on the mind; these frameworks, including "enactivist," ecological-psychological, and other modes of inquiry, dispute Cartesian geographies of the mind as an interior space separated off from world at large, and instead focus on the mechanisms and processes by which intelligent agents negotiate their surrounding sociomaterial environments.

 The result has been what Rom Harré has termed a "second cognitive revolution." The first cognitive revolution, arising from the convergence of research in psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, computer science, and other fields in the mid-20th century, marked a shift away from early-20th-century behaviorism, postulating that "there are mental processes 'behind' what people say and do, that these processes are to be classified as 'information processing,' and that the best model for the cognitively active human being is the computer when it is running a program" (Harré, "Introduction: The Second Cognitive Revolution," *American Behavioral Scientist* 32 [1992], p. 5). In contrast, although the second cognitive revolution also accepts that there are cognitive processes, it views them as immanent in the situated practices that mediate the relationship between agent and environment. From this perspective, the mind does not preexist discourse, but is ongoingly accomplished in and through its production and interpretation.

 Sketching the developments that have led discursive psychologists to speak of a second cognitive revolution, my chapter outlines five key concepts that have emerged from this rethinking of the nature of thinking and uses Hemingway's text as a case study to show how the concepts at issue are relevant for narrative inquiry. Conversely, I also indicate ways in which the study of narratives like Hemingway's can inform discursive-psychological and other recent research on the mind. Hemingway's representation of discourse practices--his staging of "scenes of talk"--bears importantly on the tradition(s) of research that locate cognitive processes not in the heads of solitary thinkers but rather in sociocommunicative processes unfolding within richly material settings. In turn, this second aspect of my discussion--moving from the study of narrative structures and effects to frameworks for studying the mind, rather than the other way around--is meant to adumbrate a larger program for research. At the basis of that larger research program is the assumption that narrative scholars can contribute to, and not just borrow from, post-Cartesian models of mind.